Dear Analogue...

I recently posted an excerpt from Peter Kreeft’s exceedingly logical pro-life argument. 

This post was reblogged by Mally at her blog, A Vanishing View.

Mally recommended and linked to an article on a pro-choice blog called Prolonged Eye Contact. The article, entitled Personhood: Is A Fetus a Human Being? is by Joyce Arthur and appears to originate from The Pro-Choice Action Network.  

Thanks, Mally.  It was an interesting read, and I always appreciate a thoughtful contrary view.

In this post, I intend to examine Joyce Arthur’s pro-choice argument and explain why it fails to escape Kreeft’s pro-life quadrilemma.

First, a slightly abbreviated version of Kreeft’s quadrilemma (source):

Either the fetus is a person, or not; and either we know what it is, or not. Thus there are four and only four possibilities:

(1) that it is not a person and we know that,

(2) that it is a person and we know that,

(3) that it is a person but we do not know that, and

(4) that it is not a person and we do not know that.

Now what is abortion in each of these four cases?

In case (1), abortion is perfectly permissible… But no one has ever proved with certainty that a fetus is not a person… 

In case (2), where the fetus is a person and we know that, abortion is murder. For killing an innocent person knowing it is an innocent person is murder.

In case (3), abortion is manslaughter, for it is killing an innocent person not knowing and intending the full, deliberate extent of murder. It is like driving over a man-shaped overcoat in the street, which may be a drunk or may only be an old coat… 

Even in case (4), even if abortion kills what is not in fact a person, but the killer does not know for sure that it is not a person, we have criminal negligence, as in the above… if there happened to be no man in the coat…Such negligence is instinctively and universally condemned by all reasonable individuals and societies as personally immoral and socially criminal.

Kreeft’s argument is based on the idea that the personhood status of the fetus is at the crux of the issue. (He actually develops the argument in support of that idea in a section of his article that was not included in the excerpt from my original post).  Arthur’s argument rejects that idea outright, stating plainly:

At the outset, let me say that from a pro-choice point of view, the status of the fetus is a peripheral issue.” 

…and…

“…ultimately, the status of a fetus is a matter of subjective opinion, and the only opinion that counts is that of the pregnant woman.” 

Essentially, her answer to Kreeft would seem  to be that, although the absence or presence of personhood determines whether or not killing the fetus is morally justifiable, the pregnant woman’s opinion determines the absence or presence of personhood, and thus plays a more fundamental role in the final analysis.  This position essentially seeks to to escape Kreeft’s quadrilemma by claiming to confirm scenario 1 (that it is not a person and we know that).  If personhood is determined by the subjective opinion of the pregnant woman, we can confirm that a particular fetus is not a person simply by ascertaining that such is the opinion of the pregnant woman in question.  Note that it is not enough only to suggest that fetal personhood may be subjective, for uncertainty only permits scenarios 3 (manslaughter) and 4 (criminal negligence).  In order to know for sure that it is not a person whenever the pregnant woman says so, we need to know for sure that fetal personhood is subjective.

How can we know that fetal personhood is subjective? Arthur attempts to persuade her audience with the following:

“Regardless of whether a fetus is a human being or has rights, women will have abortions anyway, even if it means breaking the law or risking their lives. Even women who believe that abortion is murder have chosen to get abortions, and will continue to do so.”

On it’s own, this is a very rational and believable claim.  Offered as the premise of an argument for why fetal personhood is subjective, it’s simply a non sequitur.  Whether or not this statement is true has no bearing whatsoever on the question of whether or not the personhood status of a fetus is subjective.  Specifically, the fact that many women will continue to regard the personhood status of a fetus as subjective has no bearing on whether or not the personhood status of a fetus is actually subjective.  To suggest otherwise is to regard subjectivity itself as being subjective, which is circular and self-defeating. 

Arthur goes on to describe two hypothetical women: one who embraces and affirms the personhood of her fetus and another who rejects and denies the personhood of her fetus.  She then assures us that:

“Both of these reactions to a fetus, and all reactions in between, are perfectly valid and natural. Both may even occur in the same woman, years apart.”

The same fallacy applies. Whether or not this statement is true has no bearing whatsoever on the question whether or not the personhood status of a fetus is subjective.  No explanation is offered as to why a woman’s reaction to her fetus should serve as an indicator or determining factor regarding the actual personhood status of that fetus.

Next, Arthur posits:

“Biology, medicine, law, philosophy, and theology have no consensus on the issue, and neither does society as a whole.  There will never be a consensus because of the subjective and unscientific nature of the claim, so we must give the benefit of the doubt to women, who are indisputable human beings with rights.”

This argument utterly fails to advance the case for the subjectivity of  fetal personhood because it simply assumes it in the second premise.

Premise 1 - There is no consensus.

Premise 2 - There will never be a consensus because of the subjective and unscientific nature of the claim.

Premise 3 - Women are indisputable human beings with rights.

Conclusion - Therefore we must give the benefit of the doubt to women.

Rather than giving reasons to affirm the subjectivity of fetal personhood, this argument only concludes that if fetal personhood is subjective, the pregnant woman herself should have “the only opinion that counts”.  But that’s irrelevant as long as we still don’t know whether or not fetal personhood is subjective.

Arthur spends the rest of her article attempting to refute various pro-life arguments for fetal personhood.  At the end of the first section, she explains:

“Even though it has little relevance for the actual practice of abortion, the assertion that fetuses are human beings has a potentially great impact on the rights of women.”

It would be a waste of time to critique her refutation of all of these other arguments because ultimately we can only arrive at one of three conclusions. We can conclude that (a) fetal personhood is subjective, or that (b) it’s not, or that (c) we don’t know.  

If (a) fetal personhood is subjective, then I agree with her position that the the personhood claims of pro-lifers are irrelevant.  The only claim that would be pertinent at all is that of the pregnant woman in question.  

“It’s a human!” - Maybe so, but that doesn’t matter if it’s not a person.

“It’s a human life!” Okay, great. Not a person? Doesn’t matter…

etc..

However, if (b) fetal personhood is not subjective or (c) we don’t know, we are back to Kreeft’s scenario 3 or 4 because, at best, we just don’t know.  Even if Arthur successfully defeats every pro-life argument claiming to affirm fetal personhood, she will have only succeeded in showing that we cannot know for sure that the “man-shaped overcoat in the street” is indeed a drunk and not “only an old coat”.

Arthur’s own concluding words plainly contend that (c) we don’t know.

“…there are many significant differences between a born human being and a fetus, which creates reasonable doubt as to its status.” (emphasis mine)

Admirably, she does not claim to have established reasonable doubt as to the personhood of the fetus, but specifically its status.  In other words, this reasonable doubt cuts both ways.  There is as much reason to doubt that the “man-shaped overcoat” is “only an old coat”, as there is to doubt that it is indeed “a drunk”.  Therefore, one who chooses to run over that “man-shaped overcoat” is guilty of either manslaughter or criminal negligence.  

Arthur reiterates her main argument more clearly in her concluding paragraph:

“Because there can be no consensus on the matter, the value accorded to a fetus is a subjective, personal matter.”

By asserting that there “can be no consensus”, she has essentially defined personhood as subjective in her premise.  Having previously noted that a consensus has never been reached, she has not even attempted to establish that personhood is intrinsically the kind of thing about which a consensus can never be achieved.  She merely claims this in her premise, and then concludes it in her conclusion.  The circularity of this argument is glaring.

Far from having established the subjectivity of fetal personhood, Arthur concludes her article having yet to provide any valid argumentation whatsoever in support of this position.  Kreeft’s quadrilemma remains inescapable, and I am left no choice but to regard abortion as - at worst, murder; at best, criminal negligence.